Case Summaries

Levin v. Yeshiva University

(July 2, 2001 N.Y. Court of Appeals)

Procedural History

In this case, plaintiffs were members of same-sex couples who were denied family housing with their non-student partners in housing provided for medical students of Yeshiva University (slip op. 2-3). They sued the university alleging a violation of New York State and New York City anti-discrimination law (3). The plaintiffs argued that the University policy constituted “marital status” and “sexual orientation”discrimination (3). The supreme court dismissed the complaint and the Appellate Division agreed, holding that there was no discrimination because the policy treated all unmarried couples alike. Levin v. Yeshiva University, 272 AD2d 158.

Court of Appeals’ Decision

The decision involved two claims: “marital status” and “sexual orientation” discrimination. In regards to the “marital status” claim, the judges voted 6-1 in favor of dismissal. On the “sexual orientation” claim, the vote was unanimous for a remand. As an initial matter, the court noted that no party raised the University’s religious affiliation and that no constitutional issues were involved (2, note 1).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the “marital status” discrimination claim without hesitation. Relying on its decision in Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59 N.Y.2d 733, the court held that there was a distinction between the marital status of a complainant and their relationship with another person (4-5).

The court reversed the lower courts’ dismissals of the “sexual orientation” discrimination claims, though. This claim was dependent on a New York City law which provided that a discrimination claim may be stated where a policy has a disparate impact on a protected class (6). The court analogized previous cases of racial discrimination when the facial neutrality of a policy (in the most important instance, requiring all employees to have a high school diploma) had a disproportionate impact on racial minorities (7-8). The Appellate Division had rejected the disparate impact claim by comparing unmarried people in same-sex couples with unmarried people in opposite-sex couples (8). This, to the Court of Appeals, was the fatal flaw in the Appellate Division’s decision. The court held that the relevant category of comparison to persons in same-sex relationships should include married couples (9). Thus, the lower courts should have looked at who benefits from the policy and see if persons of a certain “sexual orientation” are disproportionately represented in that group (9).

The university had also advanced the interesting argument that because marriage is the union of a man and a woman, marital status distinctions are facially discriminatory on the basis of “sexual orientation” (11). The court rejected this argument because it held that the policy treated homosexuals and heterosexuals the same in that if either was living with a dependent child they would be entitled to benefit from the policy and that if either were unmarried and without dependent children, they could not benefit from the policy (12). The court also pointed out that if the university was correct, it would be admitting that its policy was unlawful (12).

The court remanded the case to the trial court for a chance for the plaintiffs to “establish that [the university’s] policy regarding university-owned housing with non-students disproportionately burdens lesbians and gay men” (15). If they establish this, the university would have to show (as the NYC Code requires) that the policy bears a “significant relationship to a significant business objective” (15).

Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

One concurring opinion agreed with the court’s holdings, but would have justified the finding regarding “sexual orientation” discrimination on other grounds (slip op. 1, Smith, J. concurring). Judge Smith would have held that the NYC law prohibiting “sexual orientation” discrimination was “designed to secure for unmarried, committed couples the same benefits as those enjoyed by married persons. Thus, under the legislation, same-sex couples who are in committed relationships would be able to secure housing and other benefits on the same basis as married couples” (7). To support this remarkable assertion, Judge Smith footnotes the Vermont Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (1999) and the civil union statute.

Chief Judge Kaye concurred in the “sexual orientation” discrimination holding, but would have held that the plaintiffs had established that the university policy also discriminated on the basis of “marital status” (slip op. 1, Kaye, C.J., concurring and dissenting). The Chief Judge rejected the majority’s reliance on Hudson View Properties, arguing that that case had involved a finding that a policy which limited rentals to immediate family members was permissible while it was a question of fact in this case whether the nonstudent partners of the medical students were “family members” (3). Thus, to Chief Judge Kaye, the lower court ought to allow the plaintiffs to establish that they are in families and the only distinction between their families and those allowed housing under the policy is that their families members aren’t “spouses” (4). This, to the Chief Judge, is “marital status” discrimination (4).