meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft FrontPage 3.0">

SUMMARY OF ARLINGTON COUNTY V. WHITE, 2000 WL 429453 (Virginia)

Marriage Law Project

April 24, 2000

On April 21, 2000, the Virginia Supreme Court decided a taxpayer challenge to an Arlington County, Virginia decision in 1997 to extend health insurance benefits to Adomestic partners@ of County employees. The Court unanimously upheld the trial court=s holding that the County had acted ultra vires in making this policy. There were, however, three opinions issued in the case.

The majority opinion, joined by four of the seven justices, focused on the County=s argument that it enacted the policy under the authority granted by the Virginia General Assembly to define Adependent@ in extending insurance benefits to public employees. The Court responded by noting that the Dillon Rule, which allows municipalities to exercise only the powers expressly granted by the State Legislature, was interpreted by the Virginia Attorney General in 1997 to prohibit the extension of benefits to Adomestic partners@ because Adomestic partners@ are not Adependents@ as that term is used in the Virginia statute defining municipalities= power as regards the extension of insurance benefits to employees. The majority concluded that the General Assembly contemplated that some financial dependence must be established to allow benefit to be extended, but that the Arlington County policy didn=t rely exclusively on financial dependence and thus, went beyond the power the County could legitimately exercise.

The three concurring and dissenting justices agreed that the County had violated the Dillon Rule, but argued that the majority had missed the Afundamental issue@Bwhether the County could confer recognition on common law marriages or Asame-sex unions.@ The dissent was premised on the justices= understanding that the Court had an obligation to address this issue. They characterized the fundamental flaw in the County=s policy as follows: AThe County=s expanded definition of eligible dependents is nothing more than a disguised effort to confer health benefits upon persons who are involved in either common law marriages or >same-sex unions,= which are not recognized in this Commonwealth and are violative of the public policy of this Commonwealth.@ To support the assertion that the relationships it mentions violate Virginia=s public policy, the dissent cites Virginia=s law that prohibits same-sex Amarriage@ and its refusal to recognize common-law marriages. The dissent also argues that the County policy intruded into the exclusive province of the General Assembly by legislating on domestic relations matters. They note that the definition of Adomestic partners@ adopted by the County (i.e. partner could not be married or related by blood, and had to be involved in a relationship of Asupport and commitment@) indicates that this was a tacit attempt to confer recognition on relationships not recognized by Virginia law. The dissent concluded that since the majority had missed the fundamental issue, the County could foreseeably delete only parts of the policy and provoke another suit on this public policy issue.

One of the justices who joined the majority opinion wrote separately to disagree with the dissent and to assert that the public policy issue did not need to be addressed because neither the County nor the plaintiffs saw it as fundamental (based on the fact that only 1/3 of the plaintiffs= brief addressed the issue).

 

Appellees Brief